Do …scal consolidations cause large output losses? We …nd that adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly in terms of output losses than tax-based ones. The di¤erence cannot be explained by accompanying policies and it is mainly due to the di¤erent response of business con…dence and private investment. We obtain these results by simulating the e¤ects of the adoption of …scal consolidation plans (rather than shocks), that is combination of tax increases and spending cuts, some unanticipated, other anticipated, all announced at the same date and heterogenous across countries.
Introduction
Do sharp reductions of de…cits and government debts (labeled "…scal adjustments") cause large output losses? This question is at the forefront of the policy debate, given that many OECD countries sooner or later will Alberto Alesina: Harvard University, IGIER-Bocconi, CEPR and NBER. aalesina@harvard.edu. Carlo Favero: Deutsche Bank Chair, IGIER-Bocconi, and CEPR. carlo.favero@unibocconi.it. Francesco Giavazzi: IGIER-Bocconi, CEPR and NBER, francesco.giavazzi@unibocconi.it. We thank Silvia Ardagna and participants in the NBER conferences on Sovereign Debt and Financial Crises and The European Crises. Diana Morales provided outstanding research assistance. This paper is part of the Growth and Sustanaibility Policies for Europe (GRASP) project (#244725) funded by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme. have to reduce their public debts. The answer which this paper provides is that it matters crucially how the consolidation occurs. Fiscal adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly in terms of output losses than tax-based ones. The di¤erence is remarkable in its size and it cannot be explained by di¤erent monetary policies during the two type of adjustments. We …nd instead that the heterogeneity in the e¤ects of the two types of …s-cal adjustments is mainly due to the response of private investment, rather than that to consumption growth.
1 Interestingly, the responses of business and consumers'con…dence to di¤erent types of …scal adjustment show the same asymmetry as investment and consumption: business con…dence (unlike consumer con…dence) picks up immediately after expenditure-based adjustments.
The strength and the statistical signi…cance of our results depend crucially on the innovative approach that we adopt to simulate the impact of …scal adjustments. Rather than simulating the impact of exogenous …scal shocks, we study the response of output (and of the other variables of interest) to multi-period …scal consolidation plans -that is sequences of tax increases and spending cuts, announced in some year and then implemented or revised in subsequent years. We allow for di¤erences in the "style" of these plans across countries, and we show that these di¤erences are a critical factor in order to obtain more precise estimates of the response of the economy to a consolidation plan.
Thus non-recessionary …scal adjustments are possible and bring support to a vast literature opened by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and recently extended and summarized by Alesina and Ardagna ( 2010) . This literature, using simple data analysis and case studies, has shown that indeed spending based-…scal adjustments can be successful and have very small or no output costs at all. 2 The key question in estimating the e¤ects on output of shifts in taxes or government spending is how to identify shifts that are "exogenous", that is are not a response to the state of output -as would be the case, for instance, of a …scal expansion induced by a fall in output. Following the approach pioneered by Romer and Romer (2010) , Devries at al (2011) have collected and described the multi-year …scal consolidation plans (tax increases and spending cuts) announced (and then implemented or revised) by seventeen OECD countries over a quarter of a century .
3 These plans are reconstructed using the records available in o¢ cial documents to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for the …scal actions taken by each country. Among all stabilization plans these authors have selected those that were designed to reduce a budget de…cit and to put the public debt on a sustainable path: this should guarantee their "exogeneity" for the estimation of the output multipliers.
The Devries et al (2011) data allow us to study the e¤ects of the adoption of a …scal consolidation plan -that is a combination of tax increases and spending cuts, some unanticipated, other anticipated, all announced at the same date -rather than of individual shifts in taxes and spending, as the literature has so far typically done. This is important because individual shifts in taxes and spending occur very rarely: actually almost never in the Devries et al (2011) sample. Studying individual shifts in taxes or spending thus means investigating the e¤ects of a style of …scal consolidation that (almost) never occurs in the data. The study of multi-year …scal plans also allows us to make progress on question of anticipated versus unanticipated shifts in …scal policy and permanent versus transitory shifts. A plan usually consist of some "unanticipated" correction, to be implemented in the same year of the announcement, and a series of anticipated corrections to be implemented in the following years. Importantly, there is strong evidence of a correlation between unanticipated and anticipated shifts in taxes and spending that is heterogenous across di¤erent countries. Fiscal consolidations are typically permanent policy shifts in some countries, where unanticipated corrections are positively correlated with the following anticipated ones. Other countries, instead, typically announce plans that have transitory elements, so that a negative correlation emerges between anticipated and unanticipated corrections. While it is always interesting to study the e¤ects of announcements of future changes in taxes or spending, we highlight one particularand so far unexplored -aspect of such anticipations: the possibility that they may signal a policy reversal. 4 Allowing for this heterogeneity in the style of …scal consolidations results in much more precise estimates of tax and spending multipliers. Interestingly, however, the wide variety of styles produces results that yield a strong common message: tax-based plans induce prolonged and deep recessions, while spending-based plans are associated with very mild and short-lived recessions, in some cases with no recession at all.
Given that the very large di¤erence between tax-based and spendingbased …scal adjustments does not depend on the cycle or on monetary policy, what explains it? Some explanations could be the "standard" neoclassical ones: the distortionary supply-side e¤ects of taxation, wealth e¤ects associated with expectations of lower taxes in the future thanks to spending cuts. The role of accompanying non-monetary policies could also play a role: Alesina and Ardagna (2012) and the case studies by Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Perotti (2012) show that the spending-based consolidations which have been especially favorable to growth are those that have been accompanied by supply-side reforms, goods and labor market liberation and wage moderation. These accompanying reforms may signal a "change of regime", that is a policy switch towards a more market friendly policy stance, less taxation, liberalizations etc., perhaps in some cases agreed upon with the unions.
5 These results would be consistent with what we also …nd, namely a very di¤erent reaction of business con…dence during spending-based and tax-based adjustments, much more negative in the latter. Also, Alesina and Ardagna (2012) …nd that the expansionary spending-based adjustments are those in which current spending, rather than public investment is reduced. At this stage we cannot pursue this line of analysis with the Devries et al (2011) data because neither the composition of changes in taxes and spending, nor accompanying policies are recorded. Future research will need to evaluate the contribution of all these di¤erent channels to what seems a very robust result: tax-based adjustments are much more costly in terms of output losses than spending-based ones.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie ‡y reviews the theory behind the e¤ects of di¤erent types of …scal adjustment. Section 3 describes our data and statistical procedures Section 4 illustrates our results and the last section concludes.
2 Tax-based and spending-based stabilizations: what should we observe?
In neoclassical models …scal policy a¤ects output through wealth e¤ects, intertemporal substitution and distortions. These three channels operate di¤erently in the case of tax-based or expenditure-based adjustments. A reduction in government spending has a positive wealth e¤ect on individuals (via the reduction in future expected taxation) and therefore an expansionary e¤ect on consumption. As a consequence of the positive wealth e¤ect, labour supply shifts upward, hours worked decrease and the real wage increases. This static e¤ect is combined with a dynamic e¤ect that depends on the impact that a cut in government expenditure has on the future stock of capital available to the economy. The size of such an e¤ect is di¤erent according to the transitory or permanent nature of the change in expenditure (Baxter and King 1993 ). An increase in taxation will instead have an unambiguous contractionary e¤ect on output as the negative wealth e¤ect on the demand side (both on consumption and on investment) is combined with the negative e¤ect of increased distortions on the supply side. The literature considering the e¤ects of …scal policy on the components of aggregate demand has typically focused on consumption. An exception is Alesina et al (2002) who analyze (theoretically and empirically) the di¤eren-tial e¤ects of spending cuts and tax increases on investment. Because of tax distortions and their negative e¤ect on pro…tability, one can derive a straightforward negative response of private investment to a tax-based adjustment (see also Baxter and King 1993) . A reduction in government employment could instead be expansionary. Consider …rst a competitive labour market: the reduction in government employment generates a positive wealth e¤ect: if both leisure and consumption are normal goods, consumption and leisure will increase and labour supply will decrease, but not enough to completely o¤set the lower demand for government employment. Hence, we should observe a reduction in real wages: the resulting increase in pro…ts will raise investment, both during the transition and in steady state. When wages are bargained between …rms and unions, a reduction in government employment may a¤ect real wages both in the public and in the private sector. This may increase pro…ts and therefore once again investment. As noted by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) the positive output e¤ect of a stabilization program can also stem from a reduction in the term spread, if the impact of the …scal consolidation on the risk premium dominates the e¤ect of higher consumption and investment on expected monetary policy.
Con…dence could also play a role on investment (and perhaps on consumption as well). In fact a related strand of the literature emphasizing the importance of uncertainty for output ‡uctuations (Bloom 2009, Dixit and Pindyck 1994) , paves the way to the possibility of an heterogenous e¤ect of di¤erent types of …scal adjustment, mainly through an investment-related channel. In this framework ‡uctuations in uncertainty produce rapid drops and rebounds in aggregate output and employment as higher uncertainty causes …rms to temporarily pause their investment and hiring; productivity growth also falls as this pause in activity freezes reallocation across units.
For virtually all the channels discussed above it should matter a lot whether the spending cuts are perceived as permanent or transitory. In particular, wealth e¤ects will be larger for permanent spending cuts, and the elimination of uncertainty regarding …scal sustainabilty is also of course much more relevant. On the contrary, stop-and-go policies may increase rather than decrease uncertainty.
The "standard" Keynesian view argues, instead, that all of the above is fairly irrelevant and spending cuts are always recessionary (see e.g. De Long and Summers 2012). In models in the Keynesian tradition the multiplier for government spending is typically larger than that for taxes (Galì, Lopez-Salido and Valles 2007) . The empirically literature gives a di¤erent message, suggesting that tax multipliers are larger than spending multipliers (see Ramey 2012 for a survey). Multipliers are also found to be larger during recessions (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, Giavazzi and McMahon 2012) , suggesting that …scal adjustments are less likely to be costless if started during a downturn.
A di¤erent strand of the literature emphasizes the role of accompanying policies. The most obvious example is monetary policy (Guajardo et al.(2001) ). Obviously a …scal adjustment can have di¤erent e¤ects depend-ing on how monetary policy responds. The latter is likely to be endogenous, since the central bank might react di¤erently when facing a permanent and credible …scal adjustment, or a temporary unseasonable one. Similar considerations apply to exchange rate movements 6 Monetary policy is not the only example. Ardagna (1998, 2012) and Perotti (2012) show that certain supply-side polices, such as labor market and product market liberalization, wage agreements with the unions and reduction in unionization levels can help reduce or even eliminate the output losses associated with spending cuts. Fiscal adjustments are often complex policy "packages". Permanent cuts in government spending are often a sign of a decisive government willing to undertake sharp and courageous reform programs. On the contrary, temporary measures, for instance the announcement that spending cuts will be reversed, could signal less courageous reform programs. Alesina and Ardagna (2012) in particular …nd (studying both episodes de…ned by changes in the full-employment de…cit and the Devries et al 2011 episodes) that what makes successful spending-based adjustments di¤erent from recessionary tax-based adjustments is not monetary policy but a more general "pro-reform" stance of the government, on the supply side as well as on the spending side.
Identi…cation and Estimation

Identi…cation
Recent contributions to the literature on the e¤ect of …scal policy have adopted either structural VAR methods or "narrative" approaches. 7 We follow the second strategy for several reasons. First, as …scal adjustments are typically introduced via multi-year plans, which include unanticipated and anticipated components, only the narrative approach allows us to identify these two components.
8
Second and related to that, we can distin-6 See Lambertini and Tavares (2003) and Alesina and Ardagna (2012) . According to the latter the role of exchange rate movements in explaing the success, or lack thereof, of …scal adjustment is overblown by the policy discussion.
7 For a useful review of the literature see Ramey (2012) and , the discussion by Perotti(2012) 8 As is well known, using the narrative record to identify …scal shocks we do not need to invert the moving average representation of a VAR. This is important because …scal foresight might make the MA representation.of a VAR non inevertible, thus preventing the identi…cation of shocks. In other words, the VAR-based identi…cation of shocks relies guish between stabilizations based on permanent shifts in …scal policy, from those based on transitory shifts. Permanent shifts in …scal policy occur in presence of a positive correlation between the unanticipated corrections introduced when the plan is announced and the anticipated ones scheduled for the following years. When instead the correlation between unanticipated and anticipated corrections becomes negative we are in presence of temporary measures: the …scal corrections introduced upon the announcement of a plan are at least partially undone in the following years. Third , shocks identi…ed via a narrative method are model independent and therefore are not a¤ected by the possibility that some variables might be omitted in the estimation. Consider for example the case of a simple macroeconomic model which contains macro and …scal variables, but does not include …nancial variables. By imposing some identifying restrictions on the contemporaneous correlation among the included variables (as for example in Blanchard and Perotti 2002) , structural …scal shocks can be identi…ed by making the VAR innovations orthogonal to ‡uctuations in output. But this overlooks the fact that asset price ‡uctuations could induce a correlation between cyclically-adjusted …scal shocks and output. For instance a stock market boom could induce a shift in cyclically-adjusted taxes by increasing the revenue from capital-gain taxation, while at the same time a¤ecting aggregate demand and thus output. Omitting …nancial variables could thus generate a bias in the estimates of …scal multipliers.We use the …scal consolidation episodes identi…ed in Devries et al (2011) for 15 OECD countries and shown in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 here
The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 9 on the assumption that the agents'and the econometrician's information sets are aligned, an assumption that fails in the presence of anticipated sh…ts in policy. Leeper et al (2008) illustrate that …scal foresight could cause a misalignment of the two information sets, thus making it impossible to extract meaningful shocks from statistical innovations in the VAR. 9 The dataset is available on the IMF website (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24892.0). We have dropped Finland and Sweden from the sample because data on consumer and business con…dence are only available for a short sample for these two countries. The results for Finland and Sweden, and the average across countries for all the other variables (excluding the con…dence data), are qualitatively identical to the results that we present below. The results for Sweden and Finland are available upon request from the authors. Devries et al (2011) use the records available in o¢ cial documents to identify the size, timing and principal motivation for the …scal actions taken by each country. This identi…cation strategy applies to a panel of countries the idea originally proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) for the U.S. to identify major tax policy changes not dictated by business cycle ‡uctuations. However, the Devries et al. (2011) shocks di¤er from those identi…ed by Romer and Romer (2010) in two important dimensions. Romer and Romer focus only on revenue shocks and identify two main types of legislated exogenous tax changes: those driven by long-run motives, such as to foster long-run growth, and those aiming to deal with an inherited budget de…cit. Devries et al. (2011) instead consider both expenditure and revenue shocks and focus only on …scal actions motivated by the objective of reducing a budget de…cit. This means that the identi…ed shocks do not have zero mean: only shocks which have a negative impact on the de…cit are recorded, that is only tax increases and expenditure cuts. This raises the possibility that the shock series is truncated. A truncation would arise if exogenous shocks with a positive impact on the de…cit have occurred in the sample, but have not been included in the identi…ed series. In practice, given the authors'strategy, these truncated shocks should correspond to tax cuts or increases in expenditure engineered because the de…cit was perceived as too low or the surplus too high. These cases are extremely unlikely. 
Fiscal plans
Fiscal consolidations are almost always multi-year processes which include, at the time of announcement, immediate measures and future ones. Therefore, we have both unanticipated and anticipated shifts in taxes and expenditure.
The size of the shocks is measured as the change in taxes and expenditures as a share of GDP at the implementation date. We de…ne the unanticipated 10 Although we cannot check for truncation for all the countries in our sample, we can for the U.S., comparing the Devries et al with the Romer and Romer shocks. The latter include both positive and negative observations, and are constructed aggregating tax shocks that are de…cit-driven and tax shocks driven by a long-run growth motive. De…cit-driven …scal expansions never occur in the Romer and Romer sample because all tax shocks driven by the long-run motive are expansionary (i.e. negative tax shocks), and all the de…cit-driven tax shocks are contractionary (i.e. positive tax shocks). Therefore, the Romer and Romer de…cit-driven shocks, which are directly comparable to those identi…ed by Devries et al., show no evidence of truncation. …scal shocks at time t for country i as the surprise change in the primary surplus at time t:
where u i;t is the surprise increase in taxes announced at time t and implemented in the same year, and g u i;t is the surprise reduction in government expenditure also announced at time t and implemented in the same year. We denote instead as a i;t;j and g a i;t;j the surprise tax and expenditure changes announced by the …scal authorities at date t with an anticipation horizon of j years (i.e. to be implemented in year t + j) for country i. Consistently with the evidence from the Devries et al (2011) database, we take i = 3 as the maximum anticipation horizon 11 . We therefore de…ne the anticipated shocks in period t as follows Table 2 illustrates our labelling of shocks using the example of a hypothetical multi-year …scal plan
Insert Table 2 here
Consider the case in which the …scal authorities announce, in year 1, a multi-year plan with a three-year horizon. In year 1 there is an immediate increase in taxes of 1 per cent of GDP, followed by another increase of 0:6 per cent of GDP in year 2, no change of taxation in year 3 and a reduction in taxation of 0:4 per cent of GDP in year 4. At the same time expenditures are cut by 0:5 per cent of GDP in year 1, with further cuts of 0:4 per cent in year 2 and 0:5 per cent in year 3 and a compensatory expansion of 0:6 per cent of GDP in year 4.
In year 1 the plan is coded taking into account all unanticipated and anticipated shocks. From year 2 onwards all unanticipated shocks take the value of zero as no further announcement is made, while anticipated shocks 11 In the sample there are very few occurences of shocks anticipated four and …ve year ahead . Their number is too small to allow to include them in our estimation procedure.
will change as the announcements made in year 1 travel through time. This hypothetical stabilization plan is only partially permanent, as …scal policy moves in the opposite direction are announced for year 4. In this example there are no deviations from the year-1 announcements, that is the plan is never revised. Deviations from an initial plan can however be easily accommodated in this framework by attributing the appropriate values to unanticipated and anticipated shocks when the initial plan is revised and a new one is introduced.
Tax-based and spending-based adjustments
We label …scal adjustments as "tax based" (TB) and "expenditure based" (EB) if the sum of the unexpected and announced tax (expenditure) changes is larger than the sum of the unexpected and announced expenditure (tax) adjustments.
12 Importantly, our multi-year labelling strategy does not lead to marginal cases, in which a label is attributed on the basis of a negligible di¤erence between the share of tax hikes and expenditure cuts in the overall adjustment. The data suggest that in most cases a political decision was made as to the nature of the …scal consolidation: EB or TB. We account for policy reversals in the way described above. Namely, a …scal correction may come with the announcement of a sequence of unanticipated spending cuts, but then deliver only tax increases. At the time of the announcement this plan would be labelled EB, but it would then shift to TB when spending cuts fail to materialize and are replaced by tax hikes. The coding of di¤erent episodes is implemented using two dummies, EB and TB, that take values of one when the relevant adjustment is implemented, and zero otherwise. Table  1 lists our classi…cation of episodes in TB and EB.
To illustrate our classi…cation using a speci…c example we consider the Australian multi-year plan which was announced in 1984 and, with a series of subsequent adjustments, lasted until 1988. Table 3 
illustrates this case
Insert Table 3 here
In 1984 a …scal stabilization plan was announced featuring no change in taxation and spending cuts of 0; 45 per cent of GDP each year in 1985 and 1986. In 1986 the plan was revised: the new plan featured additional spending cuts of 0:4 of GDP in 1986, of 0:26 in 1987 and a partial reversal of 0:08 in 1988. In the revised plan revenue increases were also introduced: a tax increase of 0:17 of GDP in 1986, a further increase of 0:19 of GDP in 1987 and an almost complete reversal ( 0:29) in 1988. All four years are labelled as periods of expenditure-based adjustments. Note that because the revision introduced in 1986 for 1988 occurs as part of a multi-year plan, 1988 is labelled as a year of tax-based …scal adjustment even if in that year we observe an (anticipated) reduction in taxation larger that the (anticipated) increase in expenditure. Finally, it is worth noting that the procedure used to label corrections as TB or EB uses only information available in real time: the labelling of each plan is given on the basis of information available when the plan is announced and implemented. This labelling can therefore be used in the estimation and simulation of the real time e¤ects of the adoption of a …scal plan and to detect potential di¤erences between EB and TB plans. This would not be possible with alternative classi…cation schemes -for instance using the success of adjustments, say in terms of their ability to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio -to identify their status. Success can be a useful classi…cation criterion within sample, but it is useless for out-ofsample analyses, since the success of a plan cannot be determined upon its announcement. The results of our classi…cation of episodes for each country is reported in Table 4 .
Insert Table 4 here
The heterogeneity of …scal plans
The consolidation plans we study di¤er not only in their composition (EB vs TB) but also in the correlation between unanticipated and anticipated shifts in …scal variables. We call the latter characteristic the "style" of a …scal plan. When simulating the e¤ects of a …scal plan we take into account a country's style. Simulating the e¤ects of a plan is much more precise than considering individual …scal shocks and then assuming that their e¤ects are identical for all countries. Plans take into account the country-speci…c link, observed in the data, between unanticipated shifts and shifts announced for the future when the unanticipated shifts are introduced. Figure 1 illustrates visually the potential importance of this point by reporting e u i;t and e a i;t;1 for all 15 countries in our sample.
Insert Figure 1 here
In general the correlation between unanticipated and 1-year ahead anticipated shocks is mildly positive, pointing towards a general tendency for permanent corrections, but with some cross-country heterogeneity in the degree of correlation. Italy however stands out as a clear outlier: …scal adjustments in Italy are typically temporary a¤airs, the correlation between e u i;t and e a i;t;1 is 0:18 and statistically signi…cant. 13 On the other hand, in the U.S. and Canada …scal corrections have a clear permanent nature: the correlation between anticipated and unanticipated shocks is positive and stronger than average.
Our coding of shocks implies that e u i;t is orthogonal to e a i;t;0 ; because e u i;t;0 and e a i;t;0 depend on information dated t 1 and earlier, while there is no reason to believe that orthogonality also holds between e u i;t and e a i;t;j (j > 1) as they all depend on information available at time t. The observed correlation between unanticipated and anticipated shifts announced at time t characterizes di¤erent …scal policy styles. A government that typically introduces permanent …scal plans will be characterized by zero or positive correlation between e u t and e a t;j (j > 1): Instead, a government that operates via temporary …scal corrections will be characterized by a negative correlation between e u i;t and e a i;t;j (j > 1): We shall exploit these feature of the data by modelling …scal stabilization plans that take into account the response of anticipated shifts to unanticipated shifts observed in the sample. Consistently with what the data in Figure 1 suggest, such responses will be allowed to be heterogenous across di¤erent countries: this allows us to assess the di¤erent …scal multipliers generated by di¤erent styles of …scal adjustments.
Estimation
We study the e¤ect of …scal adjustments on several variables: GDP growth (all growth rates are annual), private consumption growth, the growth in private …xed capital formation, the spread between the yield on long-term government bonds (10-year) and 3-month bills and the changes in shortterm (3 month) interest rates. Since one of the channels often mentioned as a possible cause of "non-contractionary …scal adjustments", as discussed above, is con…dence, we also consider the (log of ) the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) for both consumers and …rms computed by the European 13 It is perhaps because of this characteristics of its …scal plans that Italy has not been able to reduce its high level of debt over GDP in the last two decades.
Commission for European countries and corresponding con…dence measures for other countries. The sources of our data and all data transformations are described in Table 5 which appears in the next section.
Our speci…cation allows for heterogeneity in the e¤ects of TB and EB stabilizations and can accommodate di¤erent styles in the implementation of a …scal plan, i:e: di¤erent correlations between unanticipated and anticipated …scal shocks across countries. We estimate a (truncated) moving average representation of the variable of interest, z i;t (say the growth rate of GDP); allowing for heterogeneity in the e¤ects of anticipated and unanticipated TB and EB adjustments The usual practice in VAR models is to derive impulse responses …rst by estimating the model in autoregressive form, then by identifying structural shocks from the VAR residuals, and …nally inverting the VAR representation to obtain the in…nite MA representation in which all variables included in the VAR are expressed as linear functions of a distributed lag of structural shocks. The coe¢ cients in this representation (that are not directly estimated) de…ne the impulse response function. In our case, since we observe the structural shocks -from the narrative method -we can directly compute impulse responses, thus following the estimation procedure adopted by Romer and Romer (2010) . The advantage of observable narrative shocks is that they allow to compute impulse responses omitting -di¤erently from a standard VAR -a large amount of information which would be orthogonal to the variables included. Therefore, parsimony in the speci…cation is paired with consistent (though not e¢ cient) estimation. Note that our moving average representation is truncated because the length of the B(L) and C(L) polynomials is three-years and no other shocks, except …scal corrections, are included in the speci…cation. This truncation, however, does not a¤ect the possibility of correctly estimating the …scal multipliers, as all omitted shocks and all information lagged t 4 and earlier are orthogonal to the variables included in our speci…cation. Note that although panel restrictions are imposed in the equation linking z i;t to the …scal variables, the estimated system allows for cross-country heterogeneity in the style of …scal plans.
In computing impulse responses we allow for the di¤erent styles of …s-cal stabilization (permanent vs transitory) observed in the data taking into account the correlation between unanticipated shocks in year t and anticipated shocks announced in year t for years t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3. In other words, our …scal shocks are not single realizations of unanticipated or anticipated shocks, as typically done in the literature, but combinations of the two, constructed taking into account their correlation as observed in the data. Impulse responses to correlated shocks can be computed using the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) discussed in Garratt et al (2006) , where contemporaneous linkages across shocks are based on the estimated covariances of the error terms. Following a similar approach we …rst estimate the ' coe¢ cients which describe the response of an anticipated shocks to an unanticipated one. Then, when we simulate the impact of a realization of e u i;t , we also change e a i;t;1 (by ' 1;i ), e a i;t;2 (by ' 2;i );and e a i;t;3 (by ' 3;i ). Note that since e a i;t;0 is orthogonal to e u i;t ; it does not change in year t but it does in years t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3, consistently with its de…nition. This way of simulating shocks introduces cross-country di¤erences in impulse responses that re ‡ect the di¤erent styles of …scal correction adopted by the various countries. Within this framework, only the e¤ects of …scal adjustments that have been e¤ectively implemented are analyzed. For instance we do not estimate the e¤ect of a single unanticipated spending shock if such a shock has never occurred in the sample, because the country considered has always adopted plans that combine unanticipated with anticipated shocks, moving, at the same time, both taxes and spending.
To summarize: our estimation strategy imposes cross-equation (panel) restrictions while at the same time allowing for heterogeneity in the style (permanent vs. temporary) of …scal corrections, and is carried out in two steps. We …rst estimate -separately from (1) and allowing coe¢ cients to di¤er across countries -the response of anticipated corrections (as of year t; for years t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3) to unanticipated corrections introduced in year t. The estimation of country-speci…c coe¢ cients allows the ‡exibility necessary for the model to be able to describe the di¤erent styles of …scal correction adopted by the countries in our sample and illustrated in the previous sections. Next we estimate the system for z i;t , (1), using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SURE).
The overall model contains a total of 60 equations: 4 equations for each of the 15 countries. The total number of estimated parameters is 78: 18 common parameters, 15 country …xed e¤ects in the system for z i;t , 15*3 parameters in the equations linking unexpected to expected shocks.
Having done this we assess the e¤ects of …scal stabilizations on the path of macroeconomic variables computing impulse responses to a shift of the primary surplus (as a ratio to GDP) equivalent to one per cent of GDP. Impulse responses are computed simulating our estimated system of equations following these four steps:
(i) generation of a baseline simulation for all variables by solving dynamically forward the estimated system;
(ii) generation of an alternative simulation for all variables by giving a one per cent of GDP shocks to e u i;t ; and letting all anticipated shocks react endogenously according to the ' coe¢ cients. Solve dynamically forward the model for the alternative scenarios up to the same horizon used in the baseline simulation;
(iii) computation of impulse responses as the di¤erence between the simulated values in the two steps described above;
(iv) computation of con…dence intervals via bootstrap methods, allowing explicitly for the correlation between the i;t in each replication of the bootstrap. 14 4 Empirical results
Basic results with no country heterogeneity
To highlight the potential of our proposed methodology we set a baseline by estimating a simple speci…cation which uses the Devries et al (2011) shocks as a measure of …scal adjustment, but no country heterogeneity is allowed 14 Bootstrapping requires saving the residuals from the estimated model and then iterating the following steps: a) re-sample from the saved residuals and generate a set of observation for all variables, b) re-estimate the model c) compute impulse responses going through the steps described in the text, d) go back to step 1. By going thruogh 1,000 iterations we produce bootstrapped distributions for impulse responses and compute con…dence intervals.
(except for the inclusion a …xed e¤ect, alongwith time-dummies, in the speci…cation). This is done by simulating the e¤ects of individual unanticipated shocks, rather than plans. In this experiment -which is what the literature that uses narrative shocks typically does -we thus overlook the di¤erent styles of …scal adjustment. We distinguish, however, between TB and EB adjustments according to the de…nition discussed above. In practice we estimate the following simpli…ed version of our general model (1) 15 . These replicate and extend Figure  9 in , which also uses the Devries et al (2011) data and also distinguish between EB and TB adjustments. There is an important di¤erence between all impulse responses reported in this paper and those in Figure 9 of : we report two standard errors bands, with 95 per cent con…dence intervals, while report one standard error bands, with 64 per cent con…dence intervals. We …nd that TB and EB adjustments have e¤ects on output which are mildly statistically di¤erent (top right panel of Figure 2 ). In the case of EB adjustments output falls slightly for a year; after about one year it is statistically indistinguishable from the pre-adjustment level, and after two years it is just above the preadjustment level. Note that the speed of the recovery could be even faster if one were to take into account that an EB plan may start not in January of year 0 but a few months later. On the contrary, TB adjustments are followed by a more severe recession which lasts for the entire three years of our horizon. Standard errors, however, are relatively large: con…dence intervals for EB and TB plans overlap in the year the plan is introduced and remain close, though not overlapping, in the following years.
The component of aggregate demand which comes closer to explain this di¤erence between the two types of …scal adjustments is private investment (see the other panels of Figure 2 ). The latter recovers very quickly after an EB adjustment and is above the initial level after a little more than a year. Private consumption seems to recover a little sooner in EB than in TB adjustments, but the di¤erence is much less clear than for investment and it is statistically insigni…cant. The results for con…dence are broadly consistent with this pattern. Business con…dence (i.e. the con…dence of investors) takes a dip in the case of TB adjustments, while it is una¤ected and then increases after an EB one. Instead we don't see much of a di¤erence in the response of consumer con…dence following either type of adjustment. Unfortunately it is impossible, with yearly data, to precisely assess the direction of causality between business con…dence and output. Finally, when we look at the term structure of interest rates and at the change in short-term interest rates we can detect only a mildly signi…cant di¤erence between the two types of adjustment on monetary policy rates, with more restrictive monetray policies being associated with TB-based consolidations, and more expansionary policies being associated with EB-based ones. claim that this mild evidence (once one considers two standard error bands) of a di¤erence between TB and EB adjustments can be totally explained by the di¤erent accompanying policies, in particular monetary policy. Is the evidence reported in Figure 2 su¢ cient to discard an asymmetric e¤ect of TB and EB adjustments and to abscribe this asymmetry to accompanying monetary policies? We shall further investigate this isssue after having introduced our innovation, that is the simulation of plans rather than shocks allowing for heterogeneity among plans implemented in di¤erent countries.
Allowing for heterogeneity in the style of …scal plans
The average results described in the previous sub-section overlook …scal plans: we only considered unanticipated shifts in taxes or spending, overlooking the anticipated shifts that are contemporaneously announced. We now return to the speci…cation in (1). As already discussed, this speci…cation allows for the simulation of "plans" rather than individual shocks. This is important because unanticipated and anticipated shocks are not independent: they move together according to the style of implementation of the plans adopted in the sample by each country. Simulating the e¤ects of individual shocks (unanticipated or anticipated) would mean studying …scal experiments that the countries in our sample have never run. Styles di¤er across countries and heterogeneity is driven by the di¤erent estimated parameters ' 1;i ; ' 2;i ; ' 3;i (see 1) that describe the correlations between e a i;t;j and e a i;t;j , i.e. between the corrections announced by the …scal authorities of country i at date t, with an anticipation horizon of j years, and e u i;t ,the unanticipated …scal correction announced and implemented in year t.
The importance of cross-country of heterogeneity in …scal plans is illustrated in Table 5 . We report the estimates of ' 1;i ; ' 2;i ; ' 3;i and their standard errors within brackets. We report a coe¢ cient of zero, with no standard error, whenever there are too few observations (in most cases none) available for estimation. The analysis of the response of anticipated to unanticipated …scal shocks reveals interesting cross-country heterogeneity in …scal plans. At one end of the spectrum we have the U.S. and Canada where one-year ahead and two-year ahead anticipations are signi…cantly and positively correlated with unanticipated shocks: in these countries stabilization plans are permanent corrections. At the other end of the spectrum lies Italy, where one-year ahead anticipations are signi…cantly and negatively correlated with unanticipated shocks: as a consequence at least part of Italy's stabilization plans are transitory. Inbetween these two extremes lie most countries, with a low but signi…cant positive response of one-year ahead expected corrections to current ones. Portugal and Ireland are exceptions in that adjustments occurs almost exclusively via unanticipated shocks.
Insert Table 5 here To sum up: in the experiments that we shall now report, panel crosscountry restrictions are imposed on all coe¢ cients except, obviously, for the country …xed e¤ects. However, the response of all variables to …scal shocks is allowed to be di¤erent in TB and EB episodes, and cross-country heterogeneity is allowed in the response of anticipated shocks to unanticipated ones. Figure 3 reports the impulse responses of output growth to EB and TB …scal corrections plans. The patterns di¤er across countries but in all of them the di¤erence between EB and TB adjustments is large and statically signi…cantly. In all countries TB adjustments are recessionary and there is no sign of recovery for the three years of the time horizon. In the case of EB adjustments in some countries output does no move, i.e. there is no recession, in others (U.S. and Canada, for example) there is a short recession and then in year 2 output is back to the pre-adjustment level.
Insert Figure 3 here
Figures 4 and 5 show the response of households'consumption and business investment. The results clearly indicate that the heterogeneous e¤ect on output growth of TB and EB adjustments is to be attributed to the dynamics of gross …xed capital formation, rather than to that of private consumption. There is no evidence of heterogeneity in the response of consumption growth to TB and EB adjustments, while the response of investment growth mirrors that of output.
Insert Figures 4 and 5
Figures 6 and 7 report the responses of the ESI indicator for consumer con…dence and business con…dence: there is no heterogeneity in the responses of consumer con…dence, while a strong heterogeneity emerges for business con…dence between TB and EB adjustments.
Insert Figures 6 and 7 here
Finally, let us consider monetary policy. This is important since the heterogeneity we observe between TB-and EB-based adjustments could be the product of a di¤erent response of monetary policy to the two types of adjustments. Figure 9 shows the response of monetary policy rates (3-month interest rates); Figure 8 that of the spread between long (10-year) and short (3-month) rates The results rule out the possibility that the channel for heterogeneity runs through monetary policy, either via the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates (that does not show any signi…cant di¤erence in the response to TB-and EB-based adjustments), nor via monetary policy rates. In fact, we do observe some heterogeneity in the response of monetary policy to EB and TB adjustments. This evidence, however, is not robust across countries, while the heterogeneity in the e¤ects on output of TB and EB corrections remains strongly robust in all countries. Consider, for example, the cases of Italy and the U.S.. In both countries there is a signifcant and strong evidence of an heterogenous e¤ect on output growth of TB and EB adjustments. Instead, when we consider the e¤ect of TB and EB adjustments on monetary policies, important di¤erences emerge between the two countries. In the case of Italy the accompanying monetary policy, when TB adjustment are implemented, is initially slightly more restrictive, but the di¤erences between the accompanying monetary policies disappear over time.
In the case of the U.S. the pattern is very di¤erent, with very little initial di¤erence in the response to the two types of adjustment, that becomes sizeable over time when the monetary policy that accompanies TB adjustments becomes much more restrictive than that accompanying EB adjustments.
To sum up: we observe a very similar di¤erential e¤ect on output growth of TB and EB adjustments in Italy and the U.S., while the impact on monetary policy of TB and EB adjustments in the two countries is very di¤erent. This evidence rules out the possibility that the asymmetric output e¤ect of TB and EB adjustments is driven by the accompanying monetary policy. Note that one could not come to this conclusion using the Gujardoet al (2011) methodology, since it does not allow for country heterogeneity when simulating the e¤ect of …scal adjustments. Moreover, the heterogeneity in the response of monetary policy is not re ‡ected in a similar heterogeneity in the response of the term spread. Importantly, heterogeneity in the response of monetary policy appears with a lag of one to two years, while the heterogenous response of output growth to EB and TB adjustments is immediate. Incidentally note that the response of monetary policy to a …scal plan is not exogenous to the nature of the plan. For instance a central bank may be more willing to ease if it perceives a "change of regime" in the stance of the …scal authority which engages in a aggressive EB adjustment, stopping for instance the growth of entitlements and other automatic spending programs On the contrary, the same monetary authority may be worried by …scal plans based upon one-o¤ tax increases.whose response also displays no heterogeneity.
Summing up. Estimating the e¤ects of …scal plans, rather than individual …scal shocks, we obtain much more precise estimates of tax and spending multipliers. Interestingly, however, the wide variety of …scal styles produces results that -although slightly di¤erent across countries 16 -yield a strong common message.
Insert Figures 8 and 9 here
16 The fact that results are not that di¤erent across countries should not come as a surprise. Remember that the system is estimated imposing cross-country resrictions, that is the parameters in the model are resricted to be identical across countries.The only di¤er-ences arise from the di¤erences across countries in the correlation between unanticipated and anticipated shocks.
Robustness
The empirical evidence of an asymmetric e¤ect of …scal policy on con…dence and output growth during economic expansions and recessions (see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012 , Bachmann and Sims 2011 , Barro and Redlick 2011 , suggests that the asymmetry between TB and EB plans might be explained by the fact that the choice between the two types of adjustment is related to the cycle. This points to a potential endogeneity problem that could arise not from the relation between the …scal adjustment and the cycle (which is ruled out by the way narrative shocks are identi…ed), but rather from a relation between the type of adjustment chosen and the cycle. To address this concern we have constructed a measure of the cycle, de…ned as the deviation of output from its Hodrick-Prescott trend. We then run binary choice (panel) probit regressions of the dummies identifying TB and EB episodes on this measure of the cycle and on time dummies, capturing common shocks We …nd no evidence of a relation between the cycle and the choice whether to implement a TB or an EB adjustment: the coe¢ cient on the cyclical variable is always small and not signi…cant and the McFadden R-square of the regressions is always smaller than one per cent This is a rather decisive result that allows us to exclude that our …ndings are driven by the endogeneity of the type of adjustment to the cycle.
Conclusions
We have studied the e¤ects on the economy of …scal consolidation plans identifying such plans with the narrative method. Allowing for cross country heterogeneity in the style of …scal adjustments and simulating the e¤ects of plans rather than shocks delivers estimates which are much more precise than those traditionally reported in the literature The key result is that while expenditure-based adjustments are not recessionary, tax-based ones create deep and long lasting recessions. The aggregate demand component which re ‡ects more closely the di¤erence in the response of output to ECB and TB adjustments is private investment. The con…dence of investors proceeds with the economy and therefore recovers much sooner after a spending-based adjustment than after a tax-based one. The di¤erences between the two types of adjustments appears not to be explained by a di¤erent response of monetary policy. These results are consistent with the descriptive statistics presented in Alesina and Ardagna (2012) who show that the …scal stabilizations which have the mildest e¤ect on output are those that are accompanied by a set of structural reforms which signal a "decisive" policy change. They (like us) do not …nd any di¤erence in the monetary policy stance between spending-based and tax-based adjustments, but mostly di¤erences in the policy packages regarding supply side reforms and liberalizations. The following equations are estimated: e a i;t;1 = ' 1;i e u i;t + v 1;i;t e a i;t;2 = ' 2;i e u i;t + v 2;i;t e a i;t;3 = ' 3;i e u i;t + v 3;i;t e a i;t;j and e a i;t;j are the corrections announced by the …scal authorities of country i at date t with an anticipation horizon of j years (i.e. to be implemented in year t+i) for country i, e u i;t are instead the unanticipated …scal correction announced and implemented in year t by the …scal authorities of country i. The variables included as dependent variables, for each country i, in the multy country moving average speci…cation to compute the dynamic e¤ects of …scal adjustments where the following:
1. Real per capita GDP growth is de…ned as dy i;t = log( y i;t y i;t; 1 ) log( popt i;t popt i;t 1 )
where y i;t is the real gdp at time t and popt i;t is the total population at time t.
2. Final per capita real consumption expenditure growth is df ce i;t = log( f ce i;t f ce i;t 1 ) log( popt i;t popt i;t 1 )
where f ce i;t is the …nal real consumption expenditure at time t.
3. Gross capital formation per capita growth is the change in the log of real gross capital formation dgcf i;t = log( gcf i;t gcf i;t 1 ) log( popt i;t popt i;t 1 )
where dgcf i;t is the real gross capital formation growth from time t-1 to time t and gcf i;t is the gross …xed capital formation at time t.
4. Consumer and business con…dence indicators were de…ned in terms of logs. lc i;t = log(c i;t ) lb i;t = log(b i;t )
where lc i;t is the log of the consumer con…dence indicator at time t, c i;t is the consumer con…dence indicator at time t, lb i;t is the log of the business con…dence indicator, and b t is the business con…dence indicator at time t.
5. Term spreads are computed between the yield on long-term government bonds (ten-year) and the yield on short-term (three-month) bills s i;t = irl i;t irs i;t where s i;t is the spread at time t, irl i;t is the long-term government bond (ten-year) at time t, and irs i;t is the short-term (three-month) bill at time t.
